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There are at least two assumptions hidden in the title 
of my paper. The first is that Ludwig Erhard really had an 
economic policy which can be identified and interpreted, 
the second that his policy was at least of some relevance 
for the reconstruction of West Germany's economy. In these 
general terms both assumptions can hardly be denied, but 
what I really want to challenge is the common view that after 
the war Germany found a completely new mode of economic policy 
which overcame the traditional "Wirtschaftsordnung" and which 
was by and large responsible for the tremendous success of 
economic performance during the 1950s and 1960s.
I see more evidence in support of a different, more com­
plex mechanism of reconstruction. There is, firstly, the fact 
that the supply-side of the German economy was in a surprisingly 
good shape and therefore conditions for reconstruction and 
growth were not unfavourable. It can even be shown that in 
the crucial starting period of reconstruction —  from the 
beginning of steady output growth in 1947 to the outbreak 
of the Korean War —  Erhard's policy of "free market economy" 
stood in the way of an even better performance.
And there is, secondly, the fact that by the time the ul­
timate break-through occurred in the early 1950s Erhard's 
"social market economy" had already been significantly changed 
towards a more traditional policy of societal corporatism.
But even if my thesis is accepted and Erhard's policy is 
largely stripped of its historical merits, it is nevertheless 
worthwhile to have a closer look at the man and his myth. There 
is no doubt that the myth of Soziale Marktwirtschaft became an 
important part of West Germany's "national" ideology and there­
fore a part of her political reality then and today.
Therefore, I shall start with some brief remarks on Erhard's 
biography. Then I want to give some insights into Erhard's 
neoliberal doctrine and the ideological background against 




























































































Finally, and this will be the main part of my paper , I 
want to give an outline of the process of transformation which 
happened to the Soziale Marktwirtschaft under the impact of 
the Korean crisis on Germany. With other words, my paper will 































































































Born in 1897 Erhard was brought up in a Franconian middle 
class family and already at an early stage of his life destined 
to take over his father's haberdashery. At the end of the 
First World War he was heavily wounded. During the years of con­
valescence he started to study economics at the Handelshochschule 
in Nürnberg. After his successful graduation he joined the 
University of Frankfurt where Franz Oppenheimer, a radical, left- 
-liberal, anti-monopolist was his supervisor. Having written 
his doctoral dissertation on "Das Wesen der Werteinheit" in 
1924 he first worked in his father's shop in Ftfrth (Franconia).
In 1928 he succeeded in getting a junior position at the Insti- 
tut fur Wirtschaftsbeobachtung der deutschen Fertigware, one 
of these typical offshoots of the well-organized scene of the 
German "Verbandswesen". In fact, the Institute was the market 
research office of the "Verband der deutschen Porzellanindustrie" 
and gradually expanded its competence to other household goods 
industries and finally to some finished products of the consumer 
goods sector such as stoves, watches, toys and pianos 1. In 
1933 he joined the board of directors of the Institute which 
then was associated with the Handelshochschule Nurnberh and 
in the same year he was appointed one of the editors of the In­
stitute's periodical Die deutsche Fertigware.
In these positions Erhard became familiar with the bureau­
cracy of the Reichsgruppe Industrie which represented industry 
within the NS-framework of autoritarian corporatism after 1936. 
Numerous articles written by him during this period show him 
to be an ardent advocate of the interests of the small scale 
consumer goods industries and demonstrate considerable skill in
adapting to the rapid changes of his clientele's political po- 2sition . After 1935-36 he also taught as a guest docent at the 
Handelshochschule —  the last time (1940) on topics such as 





























































































Although Erhard was an opponent of NS economic policy be­
fore 1933, there is no conflict apparent over almost ten years 
of publishing and teaching after Hitler's seizure of power.
This is not surprising for —  notwithstanding his liberal ap­
proach —  he had at that time at least three principles in 
common with the NS ideology:
- he rejected sharply the idea of class conflict;
- he conceded the necessity of state intervention (but 
within very narrow bounds);
- and he called for the subordination of the economy 
under the primacy of politics.
Therefore it was not his academic position in the initial 
debate on the condition of the postwar German economy which 
made him leave the Institute in 1942. As he presented the case, 
he had to leave the Institut fur Wirtschaftsbeobachtung because3they refused to join the DAF —  the German labour front 
Other sources see him involved in an intrigue within the super-4visory authority of the Institute . However that may be, this 
was in fact the real starting point of his career. The Reichs- 
gruppe Industrie kept him on its pay roll as a one-man institute 
(Institut fur Industrieforschung) and adopted officially his 
'Denkschrift' on Kriegsfinanzierung und Schuldenkonsolidierung 
which was written in 1943-44 and which presented rather a pro­
gramme for postwar 'Wirtschaftsneuordnung' than a memorandum on5war finance and consolidation of debts, as the title premised 
Now he could concentrate all his efforts on propagating his idea 
of a neo-liberal reform of the German economy which he believed 
to be his mission since the days of the world depression.
Surprisingly enough his 'Denkschrift' achieved an almost 
official character when, during the Gotterdammerung of the Third 
Reich the fascist upper échelons of the Reichswirtschaftsminis- 
terium tried to improve their weak position within the chaotic 
framework of NS organizations by attempting an alliance with 
the Reichsgruppe Industrie. With the restless energy of a true 
believer he finally managed to make himself heard both by the 




























































































of the conservative opposition to Hitler, Carl Goerdeler, who 
was killed by the NS regime after the failure of the attemptedg
assassination of the Fiihrer
Unfortunately Erhard wasted his efforts with the wrong 
addressees. After May 1945 he had to start again almost from 
scratch. Even his 'Denkschrift' had disappeared and was not 
published before 1977 (!).
At the same time he cannot be considered as 'homo novus' 
in 1945. He was well known by the top ranks of German industrial 
bureaucracy, to all of whom he had once offered his 'Denkschtift'. 
Probably he was the only insider on the industrial scene in 
Bavaria who did not belong to the NSDAP and not even to the 
DAF. So the Americans had almost no choice. They appointed him 
Bavarian Minister of Economic Affairs after the occupation 
(October 1945-December 1946). His administration did not end 
without attracting attention far beyond the Bavarian boundaries. 
The Landtag of Bavaria set up a ccmmittee of inquiry to investi­
gate Erhard's alleged violations of the denazification law and7his responsibility for some corruption affairs . Although he 
was indeed politically burdened with "the biggest corruption 
scandal in recent time" —  as the CSU-chairman of the committeeOput it —  there arose no personal consequences from this for 
Erhard. After November 1947 he spent his time as honorary pro­
fessor of economics at the University of Munich.
Erhard was still quite unknown on the political scene when 
in the spring of 1948 the Americans looked for a new economic 
director of Bizonia. They had dismissed the former director Jo­
hannes Semmler after he had derisively referred to American 
corn deliveries as "chicken-feed". To the Americans' mind Erhard 
might be more easy going than his predecessor. This would prove 
to be an error —  as we shall see.
He was now in a position to get his ideas carried out and 
he did not hesitate to make use of this opportunity. However, 
he had to push through his plan to abolish all restrictions on 




























































































groups which had power or at least some influence in Germany. 
Even the majority of business leaders opposed his reform, highly 
suspicious of his, as they put it, dogmatic approach. But they 
let him have his way, because his policy had at least one im­
portant advantage for them; Erhard's approach did not depend 
on complicated institutional experiments. In 1948 the Americans 
did not want to wait another one or two years until a new 
organization, as might for instance be needed in the case of
socialization, had settled and overcome their initial difficul- 9ties . The only precondition Erhard needed in order to instal 
his Soziale Marktwirtschaft was permission to abolish central 
allocation in the consumer goods section. He got it from the 
Wirtschaftsrat, the then bizonal Parliament, on 24 June 1948 
and, what was more important, from General Clay, who overruled 





























































































In 1945 economic liberalism was not popular at all. Nearly 
all political camps shared the conviction that a free market 
economy was a luxury which Germany was too poor to afford. More­
over, there was practically no tradition of a liberal economy 
in Germany. There had been a short period of economic liberalism 
in Prussia and other German states during the 1850s and 1860s, 
a period which coincided with the take-off in Germany. But under 
the influence of the Grunderkrise, the sharp crisis which followed 
the boon of the early 1870s, laissez-faire ended the mode of 
German economic policy and interest mediation changed completely. 
At the end of the so-called Great Depression of the 1880s and 
early 1890s Germany had become the first post-liberal nation by 
setting up modern interest-group policies, market regulations 
and a framework of bargaining between state and organized in­
terest groups 1. This modern corporatism turned out to be ex­
tremely efficient if measured by the yardstick of economic growth 
and of modernization of economic structures and business methods.
Up to 1945 the alternative in German economic policy was,
therefore, not between corporatism and liberalism but rather
2between societal corporatism and authoritarian corporatism 
The former appears to be a concomitant, if not the essential, 
component of the post-liberal, advanced capitalist, democratic 
welfare state; the latter can be defined as an element of the 
anti-liberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian state. It was 
more or less this type of state corporatism which Germany had 
to overcome in 1945.
What was the beauty of Erhard's policy in this situation?
There is a common view that the Germans simply were fed up with 
regulations and therefore accepted gratefully any abolition of 
direct controls which created incentives to economic growth.
I think this must be considered as an ex-post simplification 
of what happened in 1948. It is true that all Germans wanted 
to get rid of the burden of the war economy, but not even a 





























































































market competition instead. What Erhard really profited from 
was the myth of currency reform.
Of course, Erhard had virtually nothing to do with planning
3and realizing that operation . The plan had been made as early 
as 1946 by Gerhard Colm and Raymond W. Goldsmith, two experts 
on the German financial system who emigrated in the thirties 
from Germany to the USA. Erhard's own plan, the so-called
Homburger Plan, was not taken into consideration like some
4dozens of other German plans . The operation was finally car­
ried through by the US Army and mainly seen as a logistical 
operation. Therefore it was not Ludwig Erhard who was the "fa­
ther of the DM" but Lieutenant Edward A. Tenenbaum, who was 
in charge of this operation, "Bird Dog".
Nevertheless Erhard, not Tenenbaum was the hero of the 
year when the reduction of 93.5% of the entire circulation tur­
ned out to be successful. After 20 June 1948 output growth was 
no longer reserved for disposal by central allocation or des­
tined to be hoarded by private business firms but was available 
to the normal consumer, if he had the money to pay for rising 
prices. Nearly all German politicians criticized the monetary 
reform for its shameful injustice. Only Erhard defended it 
right from the beginning because a monetary reform was absolutely 
necessary as a prerequisite of his economic reform. So he could 
win the image of a monetary reformer and profit from the myth 
which was attached to such an operation since the currency 
reform of 1923-24 had seemed to have suddenly stopped the cata- 
strophy of hyperinflation. The monetary reform, nevertheless, 
was not the heart of his reform. As most other German experts
he saw in it a necessary but not a sufficient prerequisite for 
5recovery
There is another myth about Erhard's economic reform of 
1948. His unshakable faith that forces of untold dynamism would 
be released once people became aware of the value of freedom 
is broadly considered to have "transformed hopeless, homeless, 
and hungry Germans into the economically most powerful nation in 




























































































By dramatically freeing the country from the fetters of cen­
tral planning, rationing, and price controls in direct vio­
lation of the existing regulations of the Allied Military 
Government Erhard had established the widespread belief that 
the free market system had enough virtues to solve Germany's 
economic problems.
He formulated his credo as early as October 1946, when 
he was still Bavarian Minister of Economics: "When the state 
insures that neither class privileges nor artificial mono­
polies can distort the natural balance of economic forces 
and creates elbow room for interplay of supply and demand
then the market itself will make possible the optimum allo-
7cation of all economic resources"
I do not want to go into the details of the rhetorical 
framework of Erhard's economic reform. The facts are easier 
to explain. He got permission to abolish direct controls on 
prices and allocation of consumer goods, while basic industries 
continued to be subject to such controls. He put high hopes 
in the incentives which should result from that. Investment 
in consumer goods industries were to be financed by extremely 
high depreciation allowances and in general by high profits 
which would result from a sellers' market.
At the same time capital formation in basic industries 
was expected to be financed by the Marshall Plan. Erhard 
hesitated, as he put it, to lead the German public down the 
"thorny path" of forced saving. With the Marshall Plan finan­
cing capital investment all classes of the public could con­
sume the entire national income.
No doubt a reconstruction strategy which concentrated 
its efforts on consumer goods as the leading sector of reco­
very had a popular appeal. But there were at least two pro­
blems which made this strategy doubtful from the beginning:
- a free market economy on a sellers' market (together 
with the results of a monetary reform without any form 
of burden-sharing between the owners of money and 




























































































tribution of real incomes and wealth;
- expansion was soon impeded by production bottlenecks, 
such as coal, steel, transport, electricity and other 
non-liberalized sectors of the economy.
Whereas the first problem did not seem to be so important from 
the perspective of 1948, the second one would soon jeopardize 






























































































West German economic reconstruction: A reappraisal 1
?§YiY_Y§YiY§i
In May 1945, to start at the very beginning, the German 
economy was certainly in a poor condition. But industry had 
not been substantially destroyed by strategic bombing. As 
far as productive resources were concerned, conditions were 
not as bad as they appeared to be.
As can be seen from Table 1 real investment in West 
German industry had been tremendously high since 1936, whereas 
losses through war damage had been kept within bounds. Obviously 
it was easier totally to wipe out residential districts in 
the central areas of cities than cripple the German war economy 
by strategic bombing. Measured in quantitative terms the capital 
stock in industry was actually one fifth higher in 1945 than 
it had been in 1936. The quality of fixed assets was also re­
markably high.
Indices both of average age and net-to-gross value of fixed 
assets had reached an extraordinarily high peak at the end 
of the war (Tables 2 and 3). Even in 1948, the end of a period 
of supposed disinvestment and dismantling, the condition of 
fixed capital was remarkable in both respects.
When dismantling stopped in 1950, only 38 per cent of in­
dustrial plants rescheduled for dismantling by the 'Plan of the
Allied Control Council for Reparations and the Level of Postwar
2Economy' of March 1946 had been disassembled . A careful esti­
mate indicates that dismantling reduced the German pre-war capital 
stock in industry by no more than 5 per cent. The huge majority 
of plants affected belonged to relatively few industries, in3particular those which had expanded the most since 1936 
They included aircraft, machine tools, ship-building, iron, 
steel and chemicals. In short: at the end of the Second World 
War German industry was well equipped with fixed assets and there 





























































































This is also true for the labour force (Table 4). Though 
it must be admitted that the age-structure and sex-proportion 
of the labour force had changed for the worse, the more im­
portant fact is that its training had not. It is even more 
probable that the quality of the labour force had improved, 
because during the war a lot of people had been able to gain
experience in doing more skilled jobs without having the ne-
4cessary technical qualifications
As far as the most Important productive factors, capital 
and labour are concerned, the conditions for the start of 
reconstruction were surprisingly good. They improved even more 
after the beginning of the long, sad trek of refugees from 
East Germany into the Western zones of occupation. Up to August 
1961, there was also a permanent 'brain drain' of highly 
qualified workers and academics from the German Democratic 
Republic to West Germany. This immigration is thought to have 
raised the value of West German human capital during the 
1950s by a total of 30 billion marks, considerably more thangthe European recovery programme after1948 . West Germany was
therefore well-equipped with trained labour for the 1950s, a 
time when human capital increasingly limited the, to be sure 
still very rapid, European rates of growth.
Of course, the millions of refugees were a burden at first. 
In 1946 some 7.1 million inhabitants of the Western zones had 
come from outside their boundaries. By 1950 this category of 
people had grown to 10 million. They had to be fed, clothed, 
and housed. On the other hand, once gainfully employed they 
could only stimulate economic growth.
7 BAs John Gimbel and John Backer have shown, the American 
Military Government attempted this from the very beginning.
As early as May 1945 Lucius D. Clay asked Washington to modify 
the restrictive directive JCS 1067 in order to get German in­
dustry producing again. He succeeded in this respect. From 
that moment West Germany's economic revival was never seriously 
restrained by political restrictions or military government mea­
sures , with the exception of the French zone of occupation. This 




























































































by the occupying powers are included. At this early stage of
recovery West German industry was not yet crucially dependent
9on raw material imports . At the same time, until 1949 there 
was no net inflow of foreign aid to give an initial impetus to 
economic revival. Hidden reparation deliveries in barter goods 
such as coal, wood, electricity, scrap material, food for the 
allied occupation personnel and transportation services, far 
excelled the value of the Anglo-American food imports. These 
the military government kept at the minimum level necessary to 
prevent disease and unrest. The Germans also had to pay for 
this food.
Under these circumstances West Germany was dependent on 
her own resources up to the autumn of 1948. They were, how­
ever, both surprisingly large and in relatively good shape.
Germany was poor at that time, but by no means underdeveloped.
In 1945, however, certain obstacles stood in the way of eco­
nomic reconstruction. This was not apparent at first. From the 
virtual standstill caused by the disorganization of May 1945 
until the end of 1946, the Anglo-American occupation area saw 
'a limited but genuine revival of industrial activity' as 
OMGUS reported. This was not even interrupted by seasonal 
fluctuations. In December 1946, however, what OMGUS officials 
were beginning to call the "inherent vitality of German in­
dustries" 11 was being pent up by transportation bottlenecks.
They began with the destruction of the railroads in 1944 and
121945 and were aggravated by the unusually harsh winter of 1946 
By the winter of 1946-47 most tracks, roads, bridges and water­
ways had been repaired but the transport system as a whole was 
still in poor condition. For one thing, the lack of raw mate^- 
rials, spare parts and workshop facilities hampered railroad 
repair shops. Lack of repairs and maintenance in turn resulted 
in a serious reduction of serviceable rolling stock. In May 
1947 30 per cent of the entire rolling stock was out of commission 
and 25 per cent of all locomotives was also in a state of dis­
repair 13. Consequently, in the depth of the very hard winter of 
1946-47, when industry urgently needed coal, stocks piled up 
at the pits of the Ruhr valley owing to the deficiencies of the 




























































































Nevertheless, during the same winter, the military govern­
ment was very successful in raising coal production in the Ruhr 
valley. Lacking virtually all other basic raw materials and 
isolated from the world market Germany was much more dependent 
upon coal than most other industrial countries. In fact, coal 
was the backbone of all German industry. In January 1947 a 
so-called point-system was introduced to reduce absenteeism. 
Although there was no rise in productivity, production rose 
nevertheless. This was due to the rules of the point-system; 
the more work, the more food. This improvement in miners' ra­
tions resulted in a significant rise of output until March 1947, 
when they were cut again for a short time.
But there was no chance to profit from this fact until the 
transport bottleneck had been overcome. To this end the mili­
tary government launched a crash programme to concentrate all 
resources available into clearing the major bottleneck. The 
repair of rolling stock of the Reichsbahn provided a crucial 
test for a new round of efforts to plan pragmatically the 
German recovery. To accept the challenge the German Verwaltung 
fur Wirtschaft, the bizonal economic office, organized a small 
number of so-called Partnerschaften. These were modelled after 
the so-called Ringe, which played a crucial role in the organi­
zational framework of Albert Speer's war industry. These Part- 
nerschaften were given full authority by the military govern­
ment to acquire the scarce resources they needed. In this way 
the transport bottleneck was broken by October 1947. From that 
time on industrial production rose sharply. Even during the
winter of 1947-48 industrial output continued to grow fast. The
14German reconstruction period had definitely begun
Breaking the major bottlenecks of the bizonal economy, i.e. 
the economy of the British-American occupational area, meant 
a decisive success for economic planning in postwar Germany 
—  but not in the public's mind. Most consumer goods produced 
before the currency reform were hoarded by trading firms or by 
manufacturing firms themselves. From the beginning of 1946, 
hoarding became an accepted feature of economic life in the 




























































































Ludwig Erhard, were encouraging the practice in the belief
that it was indispensable to the success of a future currency 
15reform . It is difficult to quantify the extent of hoarding 
from current production during 1947 and in the first half of 
1948, but it is safe to say that 50 per cent of the output 
was either hoarded or used for barter purposes, while the 
other 50 per cent was produced for the legal market. It is 
even possible that a significant part of current production 
did not find its way into the statistical returns. Therefore, 
official figures on economic growth in the pre-currency re­
form period are biased downwards. This downward bias may have
16reached some 25 per cent . When taken into account in assess­
ing the output figures of the pre-currency reform period, the 
importance of the pump-priming effect of the currency reform 
in increasing output is greatly diminished. Furthermore, all 
high German administrators including Ludwig Erhard knew that 
currency reform could not be successful without first raising 
levels of production. This is not to dispute the fact that in 
the normal consumer's mind the currency reform was the starting 
* point for recovery, because only then did living conditions be­
gin to improve distinctly.
Foreign_Aid
Breaking the state of stagnation of German industry in 
1947 was certainly helped by the Military Government. This 
did not, however, involve substantial foreign aid or a net 
inflow of resources from abroad. This is true of the Marshall 
Plan funds, too. The official announcement in 1948 of German 
participation in the ERP raised unrealistic hopes in the Ger­
man public. Many socialists, for instance, welcomed the pro- 
gramme as a step towards a planned economy . German officials 
hoped that Marshall Plan funds would finance, among other 
things, the importation of foodstuffs, raw materials, invest­
ment-, and consumption goods, all of which were needed to sup­
port the planned currency reform, and in addition mobilize 




























































































interpreted the announcement that their country could par­
ticipate in the ERP as a sign that the US had committed it­
self to providing aid in amounts greater, and in a far more 
useful form, than had been granted under the so-called "Garioa" 
programme (Government Appropriations for Relief in Occupied 
Areas). "Garioa" grants were deliveries in kind provided 
through administrative channels of the War Department. German 
officials feared that the US would use the programme as an 
opportunity to reduce stocks of ageing goods while charging 
an arbitrarily high dollar price for them. In any case German 
officials fully expected that the Marshall Plan would make 
it possible for Germany to obtain the necessary raw materials 
for the recovery of industry on the basis of free contract.
Even more importantly, many expected the Marshall Plan
18to be the main source of capital formation . In Erhard's 
view, Germany lacked sufficient means to finance this. The 
German side also put high hopes in the counterpart fund pro­
vision of the ERP. This worked as follows. The ERP treaty of 
July 1948 between the United States and West Germany provided 
that the payment was made in Deutsche Mark by the German busi­
nessmen who were the recipients of ERP-imports would be col­
lected in a special counterpart account with the Bank Deutscher 
Lander, then the West German state bank. The counterpart funds 
were available to the government, under control of the ECA 
Mission in Germany, and served as special investment funds.
On the basis of this agreement the German authorities drafted 
an 8.3 billion mark financial reconstruction plan to run for 
two years, from July 1948 through June 1950. The contribution 
of ERP counterpart funds was not set at a definite level, but 
the plan foresaw that other countries should finance 50-75 per 
cent of their investment with ERP means, and recognized that 
the needs for finance in West Germany were at the very least 
greater than in these countries. Priority was given to invest­
ment in public utilities, electrical equipment, coal, the op­
tical industry (relocation from East to West Germany,exports), 




























































































actual benefits of the Plan, however, lagged considerably 
behind the expectations. Shipments from overseas arrived too 
late and were too small to help the German economy significantly 
during the crucial period of its recovery. In fact during sum­
mer 1948, after the combined monetary and economic reform, West 
German industry stood on the razor's edge between a short in­
flationary boom and relative stagnation. Although the wage 
freezes in effect until 3 November 1948 kept incomes stable, 
both living costs and industrial prices increased sharply by 
14 per cent during the second half of 1948, and raw material 
prices by no less than 21 per cent (Table 6). The lack of 
consumer goods and raw materials on the one hand, which caused 
even some parts of the textile industry to stand idle, together 
with the inflationary expansion of monetary supply on the 
other, from about 6.0 billion DM immediately after the currency 
reform to 14.3 billion in December, seemed to destroy the hopes 
Erhard had placed in his economic experiment. Public confidence 
dwindled and on 12 November the trade unions organized a gene­
ral strike against 'Preistreiberei' (forcing up prices). At 
the end of 1948 the federal government and the central bank 
succeeded in controlling inflation. At the same time rising 
unemployment created a new social problem; this increased from 
700,000 in November 1948 to 1.1 million by the following March 
and 2 million in December 1949 (Table 6).
The currency reform had also made investment in bottleneck 
areas more difficult. Prior to it the Reichsbahn, public power 
stations, coal mines, the steel industry and other former 
problem industries had received their funds through central 
allocation. Now they had to finance investment themselves while 
the prices of their output were still frozen. Therefore, they 
had to curtail investment programmes. The future of these 
industries again became increasingly problematic.
In this critical phase of recovery , that is after the 
currency reform and Erhard's 'New Economic Policy', the Mar­
shall Plan helped much less than had been expected in 1948,
indeed much less than present-day myths about the Marshall




























































































thusiasm of the first half of 1948 and the disillusionment 
caused by the actual workings of the Marshall Plan made things 
even worse. Out of the total of 111 million dollars planned 
and approved by the bizonal authorities and the Bipartite Con­
trol Office for the First 90-Day-Recovery Programme from April 
through June 1948, only 32 million dollars of imports had ac­
tually been delivered by early September 1948. In late November 
1948 total ERP imports had reached 54 million dollars as op­
posed to the 342 million dollars targeted. German and Allied 
authorities were very much concerned and tried to speed up the 
process, but the total for 1948 Marshall Plan imports confirms 
the slow and difficult beginnings of the European Recovery Pro­
gramme in Germany. Of total planned allocations of 361 million 
dollars 328 million dollars (91 per cent) had been approved 
by ECA Washington, 244 million dollars (68 per cent) had been 
committed in purchasing contracts, but only 99 million dollars 
(28 per cent) had actually arrived in imports. Of these, 77 
million dollars consisted of foodstuffs and 22 million dollars 
of raw materials and industrial products (16 million dollars 
alone on raw cotton).
The official report of the German Marshall Plan Represen­
tative of early 1949 managed somehow to overlook these diffi­
culties. Nevertheless, in an unofficial confidential memoran-
20dum , the German Marshall Plan representative admitted that 
up to then it had done a better job by far in public relations 
than in discharging its economic mission. He criticized both 
the delays in deliveries and the structure of imports, which 
showed a bias towards non-essential foodstuffs and raw cotton. 
Nevertheless, the representative applauded the Marshall Plan 
for winning acceptance of West Germany on the international 
scene.
Dollar aid did, however, provide a means to stop hidden
reparations, which Germany had had to pay in barter terms to
the 'United Nations', and also to entice a French agreement
21to fuse with the US and British zones . So, the Marshall Plan 




























































































It must nonetheless be stated that the ERP did not prime 
West German recovery; the amount of dollar aid was simply too 
little to have been an important factor in this process. ERP 
imports accounted for only 7 per cent of a total of 1.4 billion 
dollars in 1948. In that year, German exports totalled 600 
million dollars or 43 per cent of imports. Foreign aid, in 
other words, still financed most imports. In 1948, however, 
most foreign aid was still in the form of the old GARIOA pro­
gramme, which also involved compulsory exports of German raw 
materials (especially coal) at extremely low prices calculated 
in Reichsmarks. Overall foreign aid (GARIOA and ERP together) 
equalled 37 per cent of West German imports in the last quarter
of 1949, 18 per cent in 1950, 12 per cent in 1951 and 3 per 
22cent in 1952 . This is quite a lot measured against the
background of permanent passivity of the trade balance with 
the dollar in this period.
The way the ERP counterpart funds were employed is quite 
another story. These funds were very important indeed as a 
means in promoting minimum investment in certain especially 
troublesome bottleneck sectors of the German economy, such 
as coal-mining, electric power, steel and transport, in a 
period when preference was given to consumer goods sectors 
by Ludwig Erhard's New Economic Policy. Ironically, given 
the supposed US policy preferences, counterpart funds sup­
plied the only planned investment in Germany and the German 
economic administrators allocated them effectively.
Therefore, the role of the counterpart funds is even more 
important than its 8 per cent average contribution to overall 
net investment suggests. But there are no technical reasons 
to link these funds to Marshall Plan aid. This was used in 
many different ways, to finance trade deficits, pay off fo­
reign debts, raise consumption levels, even reduce budget 
deficits. Counterpart funds have been described by Sir Andrew
Shonfield as containing "large elements of formalized non- 
23sense" . Perhaps they can be better understood as being a 




























































































DM, of the goods provided by Marshall Plan aid. The money 
stood in place of dollars which the recipient country was 
too poor to pay. It in fact amounted to a credit owed for re­
payment to the United States at an unspecified future date. 
Until such a time, however, the DMs in the counterpart fund 
account were employed to finance industrial investment. The 
US, and this is an important point, retained a veto power 
over the use of these DM funds.
In Germany the link-up between Marshall Plan aid and coun-
24terpart funds remained very close, for three simple reasons 
First, the arrangement was a good way to win the confidence 
of a public traditionally suspicious of government money crea­
tion. Although there was no danger of inflation and other 
financial methods might have worked equally well, this placebo 
was effective. It seemed a proof of the government's financial 
reliability and provided a welcome counter-check on the central 
bank which had the power of preventing any government from 
creating credit. Thus it had practical political significance.
Secondly, the US authorities had reserved to themselves 
the right to give permission (or deny) any single application 
for credit out of the counterpart fund. The fund was, in 
other words, an instrument of control over German recovery, 
which the Americans did not want to relinquish. Finally, this 
fund represented the chief masse de manoeuvre of investment 
planning. Thanks to these means Ludwig Erhard's men could 
correct the poor investment results in basic industry produced 
by his New Economic Policy.
To sum up on this point: the counterpart fund was a very 
useful element in German economic policies. But there is no 
reason to subsume the fund under the category of foreign aid. 
And as far as the Marshall Plan dollar aid is concerned, it 
only gained economic momentum when the controversial phase of 





























































































What was the role of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft in leading 
the German economy to economic growth? From the foregoing dis­
cussion it should be clear, that "the heroic legend of German
reconstruction as a spontaneous upsurge of aggressive private 
25enterprise" is indeed without strong foundation. In the 
beginning of the 'Wirtschaftswunder' there was much more 
planning, state intervention and direct control than could be 
compatible with any concept of a full market economy. Even 
after the currency reform and the upset of Ludwig Erhard's 
New Economic Policy, wide sections of the economy, such as 
housing, farming, transport, coal-mining and so on, were not 
regulated by market forces alone. And the heart of any capita­
list system, capital formation, was not integrated into the 
market economy at all. As far as the consumer goods industries 
were concerned, most new investment was financed by exceptionally 
large depreciation allowances, but not by capital market opera­
tions .
Basic industry, however, whose administered prices were 
deliberately forced down, was thrown upon Marshall Plan aid.
But this was no more than a drop in the bucket. The world 
market boom which began at the end of 1950 created shortages 
of coal, steel and raw materials. Erhard's bias in favour of 
the consumption goods sector seemed, in short, to have dis­
astrous consequences for the German economy. The coal market, 
which had been liberalized only in 1950, again faced rationing. 
Coal deliveries had to be curtailed by one half or even one 
third of the former allotments. German industry faced collapse. 
Misinvestment at the expense of basic industries had jeopar­
dized recovery and was preventing German business from ex­
ploiting the boom to full advantage. The failure of the market 
allocation system in basic industry in fact imperilled Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft as a whole.
At this point the US High Commissioner dropped a bombshell.
On 6 March 1951 John McCloy put forward a demarche clamouring




























































































The Americans demanded nothing less than direct controls on 
prices and factor allocation, for Erhard blasphemy. This was, 
moreover, not intended to be temporary. McCloy exerted pressure 
on the German government to set up large planning authorities 
to channel raw materials and investment into the basic indus­
tries in order to strengthen the defence production of the 
"Western World. The Federal Government was ordered to do every­
thing possible to prevent the so-called wastage of resources 
in the production of alleged luxury goods. To emphasize his 
seriousness, McCloy threatened to impose an embargo of raw 
materials and a cut in foreign aid.27
McCloy's démarche was not the first intervention in Er­
hard's economic policy but it marks the climax in a long 
series of tensions between the High Commission and the German 
Minister of Economic Affairs. Even Erhard's economic reform 
was viewed suspicisouly by the economic advisers of the High 
Commission. While on the level of theory they welcomed the 
principles of free market economy, they also doubted its sui­
tability in this crucial period of German recovery. Economic 
developments as of 1950, moreover, seemed to back their position.
In August 1949 the Allied Bizonal Control Office (BICO)
for the first time urged the head of the German administration
to launch an active programme to deal with the economic pro-
2 8blems facing Germany. The American advisers of the High Com­
mission criticized above all the lack of concrete programmes 
to reduce unemployment and turning pointedly against the 
'philosophy' of Erhard's economic policy, argued that the fate
of Germany would have to depend more on divine intervention
29than on the will of its citizens.
Eventually the Minister of Economic Affairs was forced to
3 0agree to the institution of job-creation measures. The SPD 
supported the US position 31. Erhard could not withstand the 
concerted pressure of the High Commission and the Bundestag. 
Resistance in parliament extended even to the CDU/CSU group.
He indeed had to admit that perhaps capital investment had 
been too low on his list of priorities. Still, his concessions




























































































Ludwig Erhard described the intervention of the Allies as 
a "general assault on the German market economy", blaming it 
on a curious "alliance between the apostles of Keynes and the 
US High Commission". This was patent nonsense. The High Com­
mission did not make policy on the basis of abstract economic 
models. But it is true that despite their supposed attachment 
to liberal principles they were not willing to accept results 
which seemed to jeopardize the aims of occupation, political 
and social stabilization and the strengthening of the economic 
potential of the west. Since the end of the Second World War
they had, moreover, been obliged to use national planning and
34control as necessary instruments in pursuit of these aims
After the outbreak of the Korean War this attitude towards 
the Federal Republic of Germany was no longer confined to ge­
neral principles of economic policy but resulted in concrete 
measures of raw material distribution and export promotion for 
the benefit of armaments production. Even on 20 October 1950 
as a precondition in order to revise the occupation statute 
the Allied High Commission had demanded that the Federal Govern­
ment ensure by means of planning that raw materials would be 
distributed in the interests of western defence . Erhard had 
no objection in principle to this but wanted both to restrict 
the imposed controls to a minimum and manage them in such a 
way as "to avoid undermining the principles of our economic 
policy"?^A few days later, however, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs was compelled by the breakdown of the coal supply to 
restore economic controls. Having dismantled the government's 
own apparatus Erhard was forced to vest the accessory powers 
in business, trade unions and federations of industries, there­
by, of course, strengthening their influence. Nonetheless, 
coal allocation was not carried out as desired by the Allies. 
The coal industry and the interested federation of industries 
and trade unions managed to avoid reducing drastically the coal 





























































































Rather than close down a part of its light industrial 
capacity, West German industry imported as much as it could 
get of the limited raw material from abroad, notwithstanding 
the weak foreign exchange position. The Federal Government also 
requested the High Commission to encourage the International 
Authority for the Ruhr to reduce the forced exportation of 
coal. This the Allies firmly refused, referring to the European 
character of the energy crisis. For their part they accused
the government of the Federal Republic of having failed to
37supervise coal allocation and raise prices . Against this 
background the American High Commission decided to put more 
pressure on theGermans to take a larger share of the burden.
This was the target of the intervention on 6 March 1951.
The American Government was in a strong position to push 
through its plan. Against the background of the Korean crisis 
Germany was completely dependent on dollars to finance imports 
of coal from overseas and strategic raw materials which were 
in fact controlled by a cartel organized by Washington. So 
the American High Commission held all the trumps and was pre­
pared to play them.
The American intervention was, of course, completely in­
compatible with Ludwig Erhard's Ordnungspolitik. His resig­
nation, offered to Bundeskanzler Adenauer, would have pre­
sented a problem for the Federal Government. A 180 degree turn in 
such a sensitive matter would have destroyed the ideological 
concept of market economy. At this crucial moment, the infor­
mal directorate of German industry (Gemeinschaftsausschuss der 
deutschen gewerblichen Wirtschaft) rendered a good service to 
Adenauer. The Federation of German Industry (BDI), the main 
supporter of the Gemeinschaftsausschuss, offered its services 
in providing the Americans with what they wanted, direct con­
trols on factor allocation and investment planning. Adenauer 
accepted gratefully.
Obviously this shift in the distribution of power towards 
corporative business organizations was a defeat for Ludwig Er­
hard. He hated the tradition of planning by industrial asso­




























































































But the arrangement arrived at saved his face. It avoided the 
most obvious kinds of state planning which he detested. Still, 
he had to put up with a growing extension of 'Wirtschaftslen- 
kung' and planning by the 'Spitzenverbande' (top associations 
of businessmen) and the trade unions. As far as the reaction 
to the US démarche is concerned the BDI organized a cartel 
to supervise raw material distrubution. The BDI also joined 
the international raw material conference and its commodity 
groups which had been launched by the Truman-Attlee-treaty.
The BDI appointed as head of the newly founded Bundestelle 
für den gewerblichen Warenverkehr (Federal office for the con­
trol of commercial goods) a man from within its ranks who later 
became the president of the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen
Arbeitsgeberverbande (BDA) and at that time was a decided op-
 ̂8ponent of Erhard's neo-liberal policy . This was Otto A. 
Friedrich. He, the BDI and the trade unions together organized 
the compulsory transfer of more than one billion marks of 
investment funds from consumer goods industries favoured byO QErhard to basic industry .
During the 1950s the German Marktwirtschaft changed its face 
towards corporatism, but not its image. Ludwig Erhard even 
boasted of having saved West Germany from government planning 
and direct state intervention, which is of course true. Erhard 
did reduce the power of the state in the management of the 
economy. This change was not large enough, however, to satis­
fy such exponents of neo-liberalism as Franz Bohrn, who up to 
then had been an ally of Erhard. In a confidential memorandum
he described in gloomy terms the defeat of the Soziale Markt- 
40wirtschaft : "If this development goes any further, we will
have a completely different political and social system than 
the one called for in our constitution. Parliament, parties, 
and in short self-determination will be replaced, so to speak, 
by a corporatist structure, which is controlled by private 
centres of power". I think there is some truth in this, at 
least as far as power-sharing between government, 'Spitzenver­
bande ' and trade unions is concerned. They indeed make decisions 




























































































relations. It must be pointed out, however, that this type 
of decision-making has proved effective in the face of such 
serious problems as the reorganization of bankrupt coal-mining 
in the late 1960s and the recent wage-price-spiral.
The United States was not interested in the ideological 
views which lay behind Erhard's concept of Soziale Marktwirt- 
schaft. Its priorities were first, economic and social stabi­
lity and, after the outbreak of the Korean War, a larger Ger­
man contribution to the defence of the Western world. These 
aims obviously were easier to achieve by modifying the free 
market economy, even if this involved tolerating to a certain 
extent a return of traditional, that is corporatist, German 





























































































1. The pre-1948 period can not be characterized as a time 
of 'stagnation' and 'economic chaos' with no possibility of 
recovery until the currency reform and the liberalization of 
trade. In actual fact, stagnation did not last for long. But 
the transport system could not keep pace with this economic 
growth. By means of a crash programme that assigned absolute 
priority to transport, coal mining and steel production, 
Anglo-American and German administrators succeeded in putting 
the West German economy back on its feet during the summer of 
1947. An increase in output was a basic condition for currency 
reform and gave the necessary room for manoeuvre for economic 
policy experiments.
2. Perhaps the most important long-term result of this early 
period of reconstruction was the revival of societal corpora­
tism. This traditional German mode of economic-interest repre­
sentation and decision-making was highly developed in the 
'golden twenties' of the Weimar Republic but was in disarray 
during the world depression and finally replaced by a kind of 
authoritarian corporatism, during the NS period. The return
to societal corporatism provided the necessary degree of sta­
bility when recovery was threatened in the early fifties.
Soziale Marktwirtschaft, which has been a tremendous success 
story in public relations, is well-known as an innovation in 
German economic and social life after 1945. But the reality 
was less impressive. Immediate post-war economic growth and 
the Ordnungspolitik are much more deeply rooted in the past than 
























































































































































































Table 1: Gross Industrial Fixed Assets of the British- 
American Occupation Area 1936-1948(1936=100)
Gross Fixed Assets 1936_____________________________ 100
Gross Industrial Investment(real) 1936-45 as % of 1936 + 75,3
Depreciation (real) 1936-45 as % of 1936 - 37,2
Destruction by war (real) as % of 1936 - 17,4
Gross Fixed Assets 1945 120,6
Gross Industrial Investment(real) 1946-48 as % of 1936 + 8,7 
Depreciation(real) 1946-48 as % of 1936 - 11,5 
Restitution(real) 1945-48 as % of 1936 - 2,4 
Dismantling (real) 1945-48 as % of 1936 - 4,4
Gross Fixed Assets 1948 111,1




























































































Table 2: Relations of Net to Gross Structure of Fixed
Assets ("Gütegrad") in Industry (Federal Territory)
Year Mining and Investment-
Basic Industries Goods Industries
Industry
(total)
1924 52,8 54,1 53,8
1929 51,4 52,1 53,1
1935 48,5 47,1 49,7
1939 54,4 51,4 53,5
1945 63,7 62,8 61,3
1949 56,3 57,4 55,7
1957 59,6 68,0 62,6
Source: Krengel, Rolf, Anlagevermogen, Produktion und BeschSf- 
tigung im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik von 1925 bis 1956, 
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Table 4: Potential workforce in the British-American 
Occupational Area 1936-1948
Year Total % Growth rates in 1936-1948
(1000) relation to preceding
date
1936 20 610
1939 21 247 3,0
1946 22 780 7,3
1947 23 822 4,6
1948 24 249 1,8 17,7
Men in the age groups 14-65, women in age groups 14-60.








































































































1945 • • • •
III 12 15 • •
IV 19 22 • 22
1946 41 34 36 44
I 31 30 32 39
II 37 33 36 40
III 46 37 38 47
IV 50 37 38 50
1947 4 4b 45 54
I 34 39 41
II 44 46 48
III 46 48 •
IV 50 48 •
1948 63 58 60
I 54 50 »
II 57 54 •
III 65 61 •
IV 79 67 •
1949 86 78 68
a) 1945-second quarter 1948,estimated figures
b) Joint British-American Occupational Area
Sources:Abelshauser, Wirtschaft, pp. 36,39-40,43,57; Manz,
Stagnation und Aufschwung in der franzosischen Besat- 
zungszone, pp. 25,32-36; Statistisches Jahrbuch fur 




























































































Table 6 : West German Economic Development 1948-1953(quarterly)
Year Industrial Persons Unanploynent Industrial Cost of Gross
Production employed Rates (per Producers' Living Wages
(1936=100) (Million) cent) Prices (1950= (1950=
(1950=100) 100) 100)
1948
II 57 13,5 3,2 92 98 77
III 65 13,5 5,5 99 104 84
IV 79 13,7 5,3 105 112 89
1949
I 83 13,4 8,0 104 109 90
II 87 13,5 8,7 101 107 94
III 90 13,6 8,8 100 105 95
IV 100 13,6 10,3 100 105 95
1950
I 96 13,3 12,2 99 101 97
II 107 13,8 10,0 97 98 98
III 118 14,3 8,2 99 99 100
rv 134 14,2 10,7 104 103 105
1951
I 129 14,2 9,9 116 115 108
II 137 14,7 8,3 121 119 117
III 133 14,9 7,7 121 108 118
IV 146 14,6 10,2 124 112 a.
1952
I 136 14,6 9,8 122 111 120
II 143 15,2 7,6 121 109 122
III 144 15,5 6,4 121 109 123
IV 158 15,0 10,1 121 110 124
1953
I 146 15,2 8,4 120 109 125
II 158 15,8 6,4 119 108 128
III 160 16,0 5,5 117 108 128
IV 174 15,6 8,9 116 107 128
a) not reported
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik Deutsch 


































































































West Germany^ 595,0 12,0





United Kingdom 850,7 17,2
a) dollar aid minus or plus drawing rights
b) GARIOA (426.0 dollars) and ERP (169.0 dollars)
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